Bloody Treason: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy
Bloody Treason: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy
BLOODY TREASON was first printed in 1997. The author, Claus H. Twyman obtained the JFK New Frontier Award for his operate. The guide is at present out of print & as a collector’s merchandise selling for hundreds of bucks. It has as a cornerstone book of the JFK assassination & the very best on the issue of Mary Ferrell, FBI Agent James Sibert been praised, & a lot of writers & teachers. It contains for the initial time interviews with vital witnesses & published the most essential paperwork of the murder Documents Assessment Board as approved by Congress. It comprised of a lot more than 160 pictures & exhibits. The result is a complete review of the heritage, a single is that forever alter our knowing of how & why was John F. Kennedy assassin
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Ghost Wars: The Key History of the CIA, Afghanistan, & bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion into September ten, 2001
The explosive initial-hand of vital history of The united states in Afghanistan
With the release of Ghost Wars Steve Coll became never only a Pulitzer Prize winner, but individuals acquainted with the rise of the Taliban, the emergence of Bin Laden, & the secret efforts by CIA officers & their agents into catch or kill Bin Laden in Afghanistan after 1998.Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan & Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion 10th September 2001 features the facts of CIA involvement in the advancement of the Taliban & Al Qaeda in the decades just before eleven September. From the beginning, Coll shows how the CIA as soon as once again off-commitment into Afghanistan after the conclude of the Sovie
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- The Invasion (Extended Version)
An excellent work; glad it’s on Kindle,
The author has done his homework and like many researchers in the JFK murder, covered ground ignored by the so-called “watchdogs” of democracy (the press). He realizes many people have read many accounts, and this Kindle version allows one to go to the chapter in the TOC that enables one to read his earned opinion on what may have happened, without wading through the building of the narrative that may be familiar. As sad as it is that this murder was glossed over, Americans owe special thanks to those, like the author, who have not given up searching for the truth and who have worked hard to share their knowledge with the rest of us.
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|The best of the “best fit” theories to the JFK Assassination,
Since Johnny Cochran coined the phrase “If it doesn’t fit, you must acquit” to get O.J. Simpson “off” for a brutal double murder, it seems that it has been “the theory of the crime” that has taken precedence over all else in determining the true nature and the cause of high profile crimes in the U.S. TV dramas are now all replete with this trope as its theme.
Here Noel Twyman uses with a vengeance his own “best fit theory to the data” approach. It is essentially this: All that remains as an unerring investigative tool is the sloppiness of the criminals’ plan and the missteps they took in executing them. In the wake of a slew of errors in the JFK assassination (the mismanagement of the pasty, Oswald being the most egregious), and the unintended consequences that resulted, the author lays bare and exposes the very inner-workings of the crime itself: its motives, its plans, its structural and operational imperatives, the nature of the players; and even the requirements for the cover-up: all are exposed here through data that has been trickling slowly down to us, bit-by-redacted-bit, over the better part of the last five decades.
Twyman asks and answers his own most important question about uncovering the crime: Why not use the criminals’ own mistakes against them? When those mistakes are coupled with the welter of investigative information and data to be found in the rich body of secondary sources, and then add to an inductive approach to theorizing, what tumbles out is the logic and the deep-structure of the conspiracy itself. The overarching structure of the crime itself becomes all but self-evident.
The beauty of the author’s approach, which can only be described as a last-ditch and final effort to solve the crime of the century, is that by using in a systematic way the errors and missteps in the execution of the conspiracy as the engine driving an inductive investigative process, it becomes one that closely parallels the scientific method itself. Taken together, carefully groomed logic, systematic digging, and constant tugging at the slender thread of errors exposed around the edges of the conspiracy, become a brutally robust investigative guide to hypothesizing — one that allowed the author to stepwise iterate closer and closer to the truth. So much so, that in the end, we know almost with a certainty that the true nature of the plot has been captured somewhere in Twyman’s tightly strung net. If theorizing can be imagined to be a telescope, then with each new iteration of theorizing the author gained enhanced power to look deeper and more focused into the data, and at the full meaning of the mistakes the planners of the JFK conspiracy made. Accordingly, the final theory that best fit the unfolding data is with a high degree of certainty, probably the right one.
The Outlines of the Conspiracy
What we see revealed here by the author is a monstrously devious multilayered and complex plan, with lots of moving parts and lots of “cut-outs” and “sub-contracted” aspects. It would be an understatement to say that this was far from being a one-man job. Intellectually it was hatched well above the university level. The team that hatched the JFK assassination was not a set of novices, but seasoned experts in planning and carrying out complex criminal enterprises. And in retrospect, one can see right off, that this eliminated all but the mob and the CIA as groups with the intellectual, operational and financial capability to pull off such a job. I would also have included the FBI in that group except were it not for the fact that that organization was being run by an inept megalomaniacal leader who due to his homosexuality was already thoroughly compromised and under the thumb of the mob.
As for the motives for the JFK assassination, the overused cliché that it involved a “perfect storm” comes readily to mind. The Kennedy brothers had aligned against them the most formidably set of enemies ever aligned against a modern political leader. To them all, ending JFK’s life was nothing short of an existential matter. To the CIA, J. Edgar Hoover, Lyndon Johnson, the CIA, rightwing fanatics, and the mob — even the Cuban exiles; with respect to JFK, it was a zero-sum game: Either kill JFK or be killed by him is the way they had perceived it. Plus the Kennedy brothers made the job infinitely easy for them by being naïve, corrupt and personally vulnerable to blackmail and extortion due to their sexual escapades and literally being in bed with the mob too. The real enigma was not that JFK was assassinated, but that all the disparate interests aligned against him would be needed to coalesce to get the job done; and that they could indeed come together in a common cause to commit the crime of the century. What we learn here in 900 pages is that they were able to do so, and that they succeeded almost to perfection. Except that there were a…
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|An Immensely Detailed and Fascinating Book,
“Afghanistanism” used to be a derisive term in the newspaper world. It meant playing up news from obscure far-off places while neglecting what was going wrong on your own home turf.
No longer. Very few countries worldwide have been more important to the U.S. over the past quarter century than this remote, primitive, landlocked and little-understood area tucked in between Iran, Pakistan and the former U.S.S.R. In this weighty and immensely detailed book, Steve Coll, who reported from Afghanistan for the Washington Post (where he is now managing editor) between 1989 and 1992, sorts out for the patient reader one of the most complex diplomatic and military involvements the U.S. has experienced in this century.
The cast of characters is immense, rivaling for sheer size (and personal quirkiness) any novel by Dickens or Dostoyevsky. It ranges from four U.S. Presidents through a platoon of bemedaled generals from five or six countries and a regiment of scheming diplomats down to hard-pressed pilots, miserably ill-equipped guerilla fighters, steely-eyed assassins and suicide bombers. There are more political factions here than most readers will be able to keep track of — not to mention the factions that spring up within factions. It is all quite dizzying, but also fascinating and important.
Coll is a conscientious reporter. He does his best to keep the reader informed and to make his more important players come alive as human beings. His book is not easy reading, but it rewards well anyone who buckles down and stays with it to the end.
A couple of general impressions: First, Coll demonstrates time and again how much of the really important things that government — any government — does in foreign relations is done in deep secrecy, far from the eyes and ears of the average consumer of “news.” Secondly, he leaves the impression that disdain and hatred of non-Muslims is pretty much pervasive throughout the Muslim world, coloring the actions and judgments even of those Muslims whom westerners might not consider “extremists.”
Another leitmotiv in this almost Wagnerian epic drama is a pervasive lack of interest on the part of American policymakers in the developing crisis in Afghanistan, followed by paralyzing intra-agency squabbles and turf battles once the threat of terrorism became unavoidable. One is reminded of Dickens’s satirical governmental invention, the “Circumlocution Office” in Little Dorrit with its famous motto: How Not To Do It.
Coll covers in exhaustive detail the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet Union; the factional warfare that ensued; the rise of the Taliban from a small cadre of student zealots to a force that ruled most of the country; the emergence of Osama bin Laden; the clumsy and ineffective efforts of the U.S. government to get meaningful cooperation from Saudi Arabia and/or Pakistan in stabilizing and democratizing the region; and the ominous events that led up to — but did not precisely signal — the attacks of Sept. 11th. He is especially good on the lack of interest and decisive action by the U.S. after the Russian withdrawal and on the paralyzing rivalries between competing governmental spook shops that caused this breakdown. Action plans would be developed, only to be derailed by fruitless internal debates and objections. “How Not To Do It” indeed!
An additional strength of the book is Coll’s knack for thumbnail portraits of the participants. Most memorable are his word pictures of two CIA directors: the religiously driven cold warrior William Casey and the consummate organization man George Tenet. Also well done are his portraits of Afghan warriors like the unlucky Ahmed Shah Massoud (whose assassination closes the book) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Osama bin Laden himself, though dutifully described, remains necessarily an offstage influence rather than a full-bodied presence. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia come off in Coll’s pages as unreliable allies, to the point of being deceitful in their dealings with the U.S.
GHOST WARS is not beach reading by any means, but those who have the patience to get through it will emerge well informed indeed. Of course, everything changed on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001. Can a second volume be far behind?
— Reviewed by Robert Finn
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|One of the Better Post 9-11 Histories,
Coll provides a highly detailed, well written account of the history of the CIA and United States in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to 9/11. I highly recommend this work for anyone who is interested in how we came to the point we are in Afghanistan post-9/11, and how we inadvertently provided Bin Laden fertile ground for a successful terrorist operation.
Frankly, after reading this account, I became empathetic toward the CIA, Clinton and those in his administration, and the Pakistani and Saudi governments. Clearly their positions and actions lead to the rise of the Taliban. While lots of mistakes and maybe some shortsightedness existed among these players, they were all dealing with intricate and sensitive internal political issues that drove their decisions, or in the case of the United States, lack of action, in post-Soviet Afghanistan.
While Bin Laden would likely have existed without the safe haven he found in Afghanistan, his ability to train and draw followers so freely and with impunity is partially “blowback” from actions taken by the CIA, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan war as money and weapons poured into the country.
There is also quite a bit of information about Ahmed Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance. It’s interesting to speculate how more assistance to Massoud might have thwarted or overthrown the Taliban and as a result push Bin Laden into less favorable circumstances. But given Massoud’s failure as a political leader in his first opportunity, the brutality of his troops, and being an ethnic minority in his country, again one can empathize with why the United States was reluctant to pin their hopes on him.
If you are trying to decide which of the very large number of books about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Bin Laden are worth reading, this is one of them.
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